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Abstract
Current blockchains are restricted by the low throughput.
Aimed at this problem, we propose Txilm, a protocol that
compresses the size of transaction presentation in each block
to save the bandwidth of the network. In this protocol, a block
carries short hashes of TXIDs instead of complete transac-
tions. Combined with the sorted transactions based on TXIDs,
Txilm realizes 80 times of data size reduction compared with
the original blockchains. We also evaluate the probability of
hash collisions, and provide methods of resolving such colli-
sions. Finally, we design strategies to protect against potential
attacks on Txilm.
1 Introduction
Blockchains have been applied to wide areas such as cryp-
tocurrencies and finance. However, current blockchains are
restricted by the low throughput. For example, Bitcoin only
handles 7 transactions each second, while PayPal achieves
500 transactions/sec throughput and Visa even 4000 transac-
tions/sec [7].
Aimed at the throughput problem of blockchains, various
schemes are proposed including the compact blocks [3, 9] in
Bitcoin. A compact block carries only 32-byte TXIDs instead
of complete transactions (300−400 bytes roughly), and the
network bandwidth consumed by each transaction is thus
reduced by around 10 times. Compact blocks are safe because
most transactions have already been stored in the memory
pool of each Bitcoin node.
On the basis of compact blocks, we propose Txilm, which
uses the short hash of TXIDs to represent the transactions in
the blockchain. This further reduces the size of the transaction
representation in each block to around 40 bits. Txilm is simple
without using additional data structures such as bloom filters
or IBLTs (Invertible Bloom Lookup Tables) [6]. Furthermore,
our proposal doesn’t rely on consistent memory pools across
full nodes.
We also optimize Txilm by sorting transactions based on
TXIDs. Such optimization reduces the transaction representa-
tion in a block to 32 bits, which yields 8× compression over
the original proposal of compact blocks. An 80 times of data
size reduction is thus realized.
2 Background
We now provide necessary background of this work including
the details of the blockchain systems, and the throughput of
blockchains.
2.1 Blockchain System
A blockchain is a distributed ledger that records all updates
of the system state. Each operation of the update is known as
a transaction. Multiple transactions are packed into a block,
and blocks are linked with each other to construct a complete
blockchain.
A blockchain system is maintained by many full nodes.
Each full node holds a consistent replica of the blockchain.
miner is a special full node, which creates new blocks to
extend the blockchain. Different nodes are connected with
each other and form the blockchain network.
Bitcoin is a typical blockchain. A transaction in Bitcoin
transfers assets from one user to another. A transaction is
broadcast into the blockchain network, and propagated among
Bitcoin nodes using the gossip protocol. When a miner re-
ceives a new transaction, the miner will put it into a memory
pool, which is a list used to temporarily store newly-received
transactions. When creating a new block, the miner will select
some transactions from the memory pool, and packed them
into the block. The size of a block is 1−1.2 MB, and usually
carries 1000−3000 transactions [2].
Different miners create a new block concurrently. Bitcoin
introduces a mathematical puzzle (i.e., proof of work, PoW)
to decide which block is appended to the blockchain. Miners
compete with each other, and the first miner who solves the
puzzle will broadcast its block into the network. When a full
node receives this block, it will verify the solution and then
append this block to the blockchain.
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Due to the propagation delay, other miners may also work
out the solutions before this new block are broadcast into the
entire network. This will cause inconsistent ledgers among
different full nodes because each full node may receive new
blocks in different orders. This temporary inconsistency is
known as a f ork. Bitcoin uses Longest-Chain Rule to de-
termine the canonical chain. Since a fork can compromise
the security of Bitcoin, the difficulty of PoW is dynamically
adjusted to control the frequency of new block generation.
Currently a new block is generated every 10 minutes.
Our work is based on Bitcoin, but can also be applied to
Ethereum and other blockchains.
2.2 Blockchain Throughput
The blockchain throughput, also known as TPS (Transactions
Per Seconds), is the number of transactions recorded into the
blockchain per unit time. Previous work [10] has revealed an
estimating formula of the throughput.
TPS= β(λ) ·b (1)
In Equation 1, b is the number of transactions carried by a
block, and β is the rate of block addition to the canonical chain,
which is positively related to the frequency of new block
generation λ. Therefore, the throughput can be improved by:
1. Increasing b. We can compress the transaction size in
each block, so a block can carry more transactions with-
out causing pressure on the network bandwidth.
2. Improving λ. This can be achieved by reducing the diffi-
culty of PoW. In order to reduce the probability of forks,
the propagation delay of new blocks must be shortened.
Research has shown that small-sized blocks can save the
network bandwidth and thus shorten such delay [4, 5].
We can also compress the transaction size to construct
smaller blocks.
In conclusion, the compression of transaction size will
save the network bandwidth, and is an effective method of
improving the blockchain throughput.
3 Related Work
Xthin [9] is the first scheme of transaction compression. A
block in Xthin carries 256-bit TXIDs instead of complete trans-
actions. The size of each block is thus reduced by around 10
times. BIP152 [3] proposes compact blocks to compress the
block size in Bitcoin, which uses the same method as Xthin.
Such schemes dramatically accelerate the propagation of new
blocks in the network and therefore improve the blockchain
throughput. However, subsequent research has shown that
there is still a large compression space for the block size.
On the basis of Xthin, Xtreme [12] and Graphene [8] further
compress a Bitcoin block into 10 KB and 2.6 KB respectively.
However, these schemes utilize additional data structures in-
cluding bloom filters or IBLTs. This adds the complexity
to the implementations. Xthinner [11] uses the prefixes of
TXIDs to represent transactions in each block, but it relies
on the stack-based state machine to distinguish prefixes with
unequal lengths.
4 Txilm Protocol
In this section, we first introduce the design of Txilm Protocol,
and then model the probability of hash collisions. We further
reduce this probability using the sorted transactions based on
TXIDs. And finally, we simulate hash collisions to evaluate
our probability models.
4.1 Protocol Design
Txilm derives from the compression of TXIDs. The 32-byte
TXID is the SHA256 value of a transaction, which acts as a
unique identifier of this transaction in the Bitcoin blockchain.
Based on the TXID, the representation of a transaction can be
further compressed by a short hash function:
TXID-HASH = hash(TXID)
In the above equation, hash is a function that generates 32-
bit to 64-bit hash values, such as CRC32, CRC40 or CRC64.
Each new compact block includes only a list of TX-HASHes,
ordered by the original list of transactions.
Ambiguity may occur with such a k-bit small-sized hash,
which needs to be resolved by each full node. Once receiving
a new block that includes the TX-HASH list from the sender,
the receiver searches each received TX-HASH in the TXID list
produced by its memory pool. For each TX-HASH, three cases
may happen as follows:
1. Not found: There is no transaction in the memory pool
that matches the received TX-HASH. The receiver will
ask the sender or other peers for the missing TXID.
2. A single match is found: the TXID for the received
TX-HASH is resolved.
3. Multiple matches are found: the receiver will collect all
matched TXIDs as candidates for a 2nd-stage resolving.
Each block header carries the SHA256-Merkle root of all
contained TXIDs. In the 2nd-stage, all combinations of can-
didates are iterated to recompute this Merkle tree. A correct
combination will result in a matched TXID Merkle root with
the one carried by the block header.
An optimization for the 2nd-stage is to add a lightweight
pre-check before actually recomputing the Merkle root. We
propose a lightweight Merkle tree for pre-check by replacing
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SHA256 with CRC32, which leads to a 4-byte root. When
creating a new block, the 4-byte CRC32-Merkle root is com-
puted using the TXIDs and encoded into the block. This yields
a 40× acceleration in searching the right combination.
If any of the combinations can not match the Merkle root
in the block header, the receiver will fall back to ask the
sender to transfer the complete TXID list of the block, which
is described in the original BIP152 proposal. This situation
happens when at least one TXID in the memory pool has the
same TX-HASH in the received TX-HASH list, but the TXID is
not the one that the block intends to include.
4.2 Probability of a Single Collision
Iterating the combination of candidates consumes a consid-
erable amount of CPU time, and incurs additional latency.
The feasibility of Txilm thus highly relies on the probability
of hash collisions. We use the single collision to model this
probability.
Definition 1 (Single Collision) We assume M is the set of
all unconfirmed transactions contained in a memory pool,
and b is an unconfirmed block. Given TX-HASH h ∈ b and its
original transaction tx1, ∃ tx2 ∈ M ∨ tx2 ∈ b, tx1 6= tx2, but
hash(tx2)= h.
In definition 1, a single collision can occur both within b or
between b and M. Psc can be formulated as the Generalized
Birthday Problem [1]. We assume a memory pool M contains
m transactions, and a new block b carries n TX-HASHes. M
may in advance contain any of the transactions that b intends
to carry, which will influence the value of Psc. But in extreme
case M contains none of the transactions, which will lead to
the upper bond of Psc. In this case the probability of a single
collision is approximated as:
Psc = 1−
[
1−
(
1
2
)k](mn+ n22 )
(2)
4.3 Protocol Optimization
Txilm can be further optimized to reduce the probability of
hash collisions. In this optimization, both the TX-HASHes in
a new block and the transactions in the memory pools are
sorted by the lexicographic order of TXIDs. Given a TX-HASH
h in the block b with TXID = id, the candidate space of h
will be narrowed to a range bound by id and its previous
adjacent TXID in b, instead of the entire memory pool. This
dramatically reduces the collision probability and the cost
of resolving ambiguity, which allows even shorter hash with
higher compression ratio.
We also use Psc to evaluate the effect of this optimization.
If each memory pool contains m transactions, and n TXIDs in
a new block are evenly distributed in the sorted memory pool,
the size of the collision space will be reduced from m to mn .
The model for Psc is therefore updated as:
Psc = 1−
[
1−
(
1
2
)k]m
(3)
4.4 Simulation
We simulated the hash collisions to evaluate above probability
models. Sets M and b were defined to simulate the memory
pool and new block respectively. We assume |M| = m and
|b|= n. Our simulation set m= 1000, and k was iterated from
20 to 40. During each iteration of k, we simulated the compu-
tation and packing process of TX-HASHes for N = 100,000
times, and counted Tk, the time of at least one single collision
occurring between M and b or within b. Psc is approximated
as TkN .
20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
k
P s
c
n=100
n=300
n=500
Figure 1: Psc before Optimization
We first simulated the model of Psc under the condition
that above optimization was not applied. Figure 1 reveals the
relation between Psc and k with n = 100, 300, 500 respectively.
The maximum value of k on the horizontal axis is 35 because
Psc converges to 0 when k > 35. For each value of n, Psc
decreases with the increase of k. Furthermore, it demonstrates
that Psc increases with the block size n, since a large block
is more likely to contain TX-HASHes that collide with other
ones.
Figure 2 reveals the simulation results after the optimiza-
tion. This optimization achieves much smaller Psc compared
with the results in Figure 1, and Psc converges to 0 when k >
25. We recommend k = 32 as a reasonable value with a bet-
ter compression ratio and low collision rate. When m= 3000
and n= 200, a 32-bit TX-HASH makes Psc = 0.00000072. This
yields an 80 times of data size reduction compared with the
original version of the blockchain.
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Figure 2: Psc after Optimization
5 Collision Attack
An attacker may create a new transaction with its TX-HASH
matched to an existing transaction. A flood of such mali-
cious transactions for collisions can invalidate our collision
probability analysis and make the verification of new blocks
expensive, which eventually results in higher fork rate. We
propose simple strategies to address this potential attack.
A simple strategy for defense is to introduce a salt while
calculating the TX-HASH:
TXID-HASH = hash( Salt + TXID )
The salt is specific to the block carrying these TX-HASHes,
and is included in the encoded data (e.g., the block header).
For example, just take the CRC32-Merkle root as the salt, or
introduce another 4-byte field with random bits.
By introducing salts, the attacker cannot create malicious
transactions that match existing transactions, until a new block
carrying these existing transactions is generated. Malicious
transactions are also unlikely to reach the entire network faster
than a new block unless the attacker controls a large botnet.
In extreme cases, the massive collision attack is still possi-
ble regardless of the high cost. We require miners fall back to
TXID list when the entire network is under attack. Such attack
can be noticed by all miners when verifying new blocks. A
miner can simply count the number of ambiguous TX-HASH
per-block. If the counts are significantly higher than the ex-
pected value and forks are observed, the next block should
fall back to TXID list.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes Txilm, a protocol that compresses trans-
action representation in the blockchain. Each block in Txilm
carries the short hashes of TXIDs (i.e., TX-HASHes) instead of
complete transactions. When receiving a block from the peers,
a full node can search the transactions in its local memory
pool based on the TX-HASHes and resolve the hash collisions
using Merkle root. We analyze the probability of hash colli-
sions by simulation, and use the salted hash to protect against
potential attacks. Combined with the sorted transactions based
on TXIDs, Txilm realizes 80 times of data size reduction and
dramatically saves the network bandwidth. This will lead to a
higher blockchain throughput.
In our future work, we will implement Txilm Protocol,
and evaluate the effect of this protocol on the blockchain
throughput by experiments.
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